The March Against England: Operation Sea Lion 1940 -’41
Book Review and Commentary by B. Chapski
This book, has 368 pages. The author is an excellent writer with superb skills. He does not promise the world and give up peanuts. He emphasizes that he had no intention of using “if” as as a qualifier when laying out his cards pertaining to the massive buildup of barges for Sea Lion (Seelowe, Hitler’s dream of invading GB). He is able to keep you glued to his labour. His fertile narrative pertains to the time when the Third Reich was at the height of her power. On the other hand, much of Britain’s weaponry was of WWI vintage. As for the debacle at Dunkirk, the British were lucky that Reichsmarschall Herman Goring assured Hitler that his Luftwaffe bombs could prevent that evacuation; assuring he could annihilate the BEF and save thousands of German lives. It's interesting reading annuals that are becoming like ancient history. I hope you enjoy this fun 3 page brief.
The Third Reich was a power unto herself. She had materials and supplies from the mighty Czech weapon and industrial facilities. She not only had the arsenal from her Polish campaign, but also enormous quantities of material from her conquest of France. Despite propaganda she was the most powerful military force on planet Earth.
The author, Robert Forczyk, is methodologically talented. He takes his readers into the ideology of Operation Sea Lion (Unternehmen Seelowe) and brings them along 12 fascinating chapters. These include info on diplomacy, espionage, invasion potentials and the odds of success. He even includes tidbits about events on the drawing boards of planners within Berlin’s war rooms. There were plans for the invasions of such places as Switzerland (Unternehmen Tenuenbaum) and Iceland (Unternehmen Grun). Plans for Iceland had to be shelved because the British beat them to the punch. But there are various hypotheses as to why Switzerland was not occupied. Switzerland had a world renowned banking system and a neutral country could be more than useful regarding diplomacy. In addition to this and perhaps most pertinent was the early planned invasion of the Soviet Union. In June of 1940 Major Erich Marcks developed plans for attacking Russia. The USSR was hit on June 22, 1941.
Hitler had been told that crossing the English channel would be a piece of cake, “like crossing a wide river.” Admiral Erich Raeder tried to talk Hitler out of designs on GB. Then he did everything he could to delay Seelowe. He feared for his Kriegsmarine. According to him, the Royal Navy was a potent force to be reckoned with. General Lieutenant Hans Geisler insisted that the Luftwaffe could only accomplish goals of significant damage by a protracted two year bombing campaign. (p. 43) Besides, Churchill was in bed with the Americans, had his radar and the RAF was more than impressive in defending Britain's airspace. Reichsmarschall Goring insisted that his Luftwaffe could knock out the RAF, but that was not the case. The British Bombing Command was somewhat like Goring; It insisted that it could bring the Third Reich to its knees within a year. (p.38) On the other side of the coin, it can also be noted, that despite propaganda, Goring’s night raids, with action delayed bombs, were quite successful in terrifying the English.
This was a time when Hitler thought German clout could intimidate GB into negotiation. The general consensus in Berlin and among PoliSci scholars was that Churchill had little to gain by continuing war. Also, initially Churchill’s position on 110 Downing St. was relatively weak. He did have some global support, even militarily. For example the Royal Navy of the Netherlands brought four brand-new high tech submarines to England along with 1,500 troops. Dutch, Czech and numerous Polish pilots reached GB. Norwegians contributed over 25,000 sailors, the Poles brought ships and sailors, plus over 30,000 ground troops. In addition to the immense backing of the British Empire, few could honestly deny that President Roosevelt seemed quite sympathetic. Charles de Gaulle is world famous, however, in the summer of 1940 he had only 5,000 volunteers. Churchill and the British military considered all Frenchmen as defeatist. (p. 33) Despite all of this, it was believed that after Dunkirk a diplomatic solution could be achieved. After all, they were pro German elements amongst the elite in London. One has only to mention Lord Halifax. Yet diplomatic records show that Hitler was inconsistent with diplomacy. He would talk peace and then ramble about how he could bring devastation. He simply could not believe Great Britain would not sit for negotiations at a peace table.
It has to be emphasized that the Third Reich at that time had the world's most impressive military machine. It is more than understandable why the Fuhrer’s Directive No. 16 was initiated. He, not Churchill, would decide if war would move east or west. An invasion of GB would not include General Winter and troops would not be freezing by the millions. If the Germans were able to land troops in England, could anyone reasonably affirm that GB would of had the resources to fight the preeminent military mechanism of the world? In Directive No. 6 (Fall Gelb, Instruction No. 1) the goal was to secure as much territory as possible to serve as a base for air and sea operations in Britain. Fuhrer Directive No. 9 verified that he wanted to annihilate the English economy once he had done away with Allied field armies. (p. 42) Earlier, in 1939, the Germans had completely mapped England from the sky. A group studied and planned for an amphibious landing. GB was a tough nut to crack and she was outside of the Lebensraum ideology.
Korvettenkapitan Hans-Jurgen Reinicke’s Study Red (Studie Rot) stressed that it would be very difficult to even attempt landing in GB without first eradicating the Royal Navy. (p. 44) Another study noted that three or four divisions supported by airborne landings in East Anglia could be possible. Meanwhile the Kriegsmarine and Wehrmacht updated and laboured about costs for invasion. A Major problem was naval transport capabilities. It was estimated that special crafts would be needed for 40 divisions, on eight separate landings, on an area that was 235 miles wide. (p. 55) The first wave would consist of 260,000 troops. On July 16 Hitler said he had decided to prepare for landing. Once again Raeder did everything in his power to delay organizational setups. On July 21, he stressed that the Kriegsmarine, in no way could come up with transporting 40 divisions by sea. Despite all these objections Hitler ordered that invasion sea craft be assembled; that it be given top priority. He insisted all economic resources be allocated. (p. 58) Raeder did not give up. A week later he informed that it would take 10 days just to land the first wave. This infuriated Hitler. Late September was chosen as the date that the first day of amphibious endeavor would begin.
On July 29 another planning conference begin. Once again Raeder was intent on canceling what he regarded as a suicide adventure. He informed that he could only provide three torpedo boats and four destroyers to escort the force. He insisted that the invasion be postponed until the spring of 1941. By then there would be new ships, including the Bismarck and Tirpitz.
On July 30, 1940 during a conference pertaining to Sea Lion, General Major Eric Marcks was given the task of developing an operational plan for attacking the Soviet Union. (p.60) On the third day of this conference (July 31) Raeder proposed a limited invasion of 30,000 troops. It would be initiated in the distant future, with a set date of May 1941. At that, Hitler brought up the issue of Russia. Raeder had shelved Seelowe. He empathetically emphasized that GB was clinging her hopes to Russia and the sooner Russia was crushed the better. He said that the invasion would be in May 1941. Brauchitsch remarked that there was a question whether a two front should be facilitated. The author believes Hitler was frustrated that England was not knocked out and he centered his anger on his decades-long psychological adversary, Russia. He had been emphasizing deep seated hatred towards Russia since his youth and he was at it again. Forczyk tells us Hitler was all “over the place.” He again wanted to know about the feasibility of attacking Iceland and Switzerland. (p. 61) He then reverted back to Sea Lion with Directive No. 17. This was for the intensification of air and sea attacks against GB.
On August 26 Hitler ordered plans be modified to accommodate transport capabilities. On August 30 a final date of September15th was set for the implementation of Seelowe. Deceptive and diversionary operations were stimulated. All books that I have read about Sea Lion have affirmed that prior to WWII the Kriegsmarine had not thought of amphibious landings. This book is the same.
A total of 2,410 barges were collected. The author goes on to describe the various types of sea craft. In addition to tug boats there were all kinds of other vessels. Spare parts and even drinking water for 3,000 transports was considered. Thousands of mines were to be laid as a defensive mechanism. As for supporting air craft, by the time Sea Lion was to go into operation there were 200 - 220 Ju- 52 transports and 40 to 50 gliders. We read that Germany had created an invasion fleet virtually out of thin air. It was an amazing accomplishment.
The author spends several pages pertaining to lend lease. He indicates that loans from the USA enriched America. It also just about bankrupted GB. According to Forczyk, Britain's ability to evaluate the danger of Seelowe was enhanced by superior intelligence gathering. He refers to the Polish mathematician Marian Rejewski breaking the enigma encrypted German coding.
Despite GB's superior gathering of intelligence, Germany’s military superiority allowed her to move in any direction she chose. England's counterintelligence detected possible treachery within the US London Embassy. As for Fifth Column issues, the US contained many communist sympathizers. Tyler Kent, a State Department employee, had stolen 2,000 cables. He was arrested and the US wavered his diplomatic immunity. GB’s Oswald Mosley was incarcerated.
The author informs his readership that Hitler needed accurate intelligence if Sea Lion was to succeed. Unfortunately for him the Wehrmacht was full of men who opposed not only his racial ideology (pertaining to Europeans), but his aggressive military behavior towards his neighbors. Forczyk believes that Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who headed the OKW’s intelligent Agency, might have been in communication with GB’s M16. Certainly he sabotaged efforts to bring Spain into the war. Another example was the German physicist Hans Ferdinand Mayer, Director of research in Berlin’s Siemens. He supplied the allies with data on a variety of secrets.
Then there was Josef Beppo Schmid, a longtime friend of Goring and Hitler. He was the senior intelligent officer of the Luftwaffe. He knew practically nothing about intelligence work. He constantly supplied erroneous info which greatly harmed the German war effort. He even asserted the RAF would be defeated, claimed German planes were better at dogfighting and exaggerated British losses by more than 300%. (p. 117)
The author spends a lot of time writing about Spain. It seems that Franco was concerned about being an Axis satellite. The Spanish did send 18,000 volunteers to participate in operation Barbarossa. (p. 128) There were considerations about invading Gibraltar.
By that time the reader reaches page 131 (Chapter IV) the author is speaking about bombing England. The Germans had the most powerful Air Force in the world at that time. The Luftwaffe had 1,437 twin engine bombers. Unfortunately for them they had weak defensive armament and could not operate properly without a very strong escort. Polish squadrons shot down 50 German bombers in a short time. The Germans were quite successful in France and Poland but England was a different matter. It had an efficient radar system. Nevertheless, anyone who tried to mitigate bombing accomplishments would be deviating from the truth. Unfortunately for the Germans, Herman Goring was reluctant to support any suggestions by Raeder and other high ranking navy officials who advocated bombing Royal Navy Ports. Thus, Goring was not interested in bombing Naval bases. (p. 156) Donitz’s u-boats , from the period of September 1939 to May 1940 sunk 261 ships. Convoys were attacked. On the critical Halifax-Liverpool route, the first 46 convoys, which totaled 1,613 ships saw five sunk and three damaged. U-boats were a terror and when ships were sunk all others scattered. The amount of tonnage sunk was tremendous. The author goes on and on about ships prowling the ocean. All this was even before the crème de la crème, Bismarck, was operational.
It seemed to me that an awful lot pertaining to the Royal Navy and the Kriegsmarine was not related to Seelowe. For instance, we read about Churchill sending military assistance to Greece. Forczyk does refer to British anti-invasion capabilities (1940-‘410). The book contains plenty of statistics. For example, chief air Marshal Hugh Dowding from July 1 to September 23 lost a total of 576 fighters and 337 pilots. However, on September 24 he still had 1,509 pilots. He also had 50 fighter squadrons. They were the reason GB achieved air “superiority.” We read that by September 1940 Churchill believed more in the RAF than the Royal Navy.
As for the potential of Seelowe, the British had mined their beaches. Many of these mines were protection against tanks. Whether the Germans could have crossed the English Channel is quite questionable. After all, no sane person could allege that the Kriegsmarine would have been able to defeat the Royal Navy. That having been said, it is quite doubtful the British would have been able to eradicate the German military if it had made successful landings. The British had minimal training, the home guard was essentially made up of locals. On the other hand, at that time, German infantrymen were the most experienced in the world. In the 1970s organizations had hypothetical scenarios, but that's exactly what they were. Nothing more.
Operation Seelowe, like operation Barbarossa, saw postponements. The last postponement was on September 17, 1940. The British never knew about the postponement. We learn that Hitler never officially canceled operation Seelowe. However, he had his hands full in other areas. With a full plate he was never able to return to Sea Lion. Hitler complained in 1943 that he never should have let Raeder talk him out of conducting it. (p. 272)
Did Russia overwhelm the Wehrmacht and cause Seelowe to disappear? What do you think?
As for Hitler, he had overextended himself. The author believes it was unlikely that Hitler could have overrun the British homeland. There would have been too many consequences.
Operation Sea Lion would not go down in history like other engagements such as Stalingrad. However, it and Churchill committed itself to a war it could not win by itself, against the world's mightiest military machine. In the end GB was reduced to a financial existence dependent upon Washington. The economic commitment, emotion and blood spent might not be known by most of today’s generation, who overall don’t seem to have any vested interest.
The annuals of European based wars are becoming like ancient folklore. About 40 years ago Forczyk’s labour would have perhaps sold hundreds of thousands of books. Our grandfathers retained interest in WWI; our dad’s WWII. Most millennials know zilch, nic, zero about WWII other than Hitler in the Holocaust. Half a century ago this book would have sold like hitcakes.
